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Predictive Features of a Cockpit Traffic Display: A Workload Assessment
Christopher D. Wickens and Ephimia Morphew
Abstract
Eighteen pilots flew a series of traffic avoidance maneuvers in an experiment designed to assess the support
offered and workload imposed by different levels of traffic display information in a free flight simulation. Three display
prototypes were compared which differed in traffic information provided. A BASELINE (BL) display provided current
and (2 "a order) predicted information regarding ownship and current information of an intruder aircraft, represented on
lateral and vertical displays in a coplanar suite. An INTRUDER PREDICTOR (IP) display, augmented the baseline
display by providing lateral and vertical prediction of the intruder aircraft. A THREAT VECTOR (TV) display added to
the IP display a vector that indicates the direction from ownship to the intruder at the predicted point of closest contact
(POCC). The length of the vector corresponds to the radius of the protected zone, and the distance of the intersection of
the vector with ownship predictor, corresponds to the time available till POCC or loss of separation. Pilots time shared
the traffic avoidance task with a secondary task requiring them to monitor the top of the display for faint targets. This
task simulated the visual demands of out-of-cockpit scanning, and hence was used to estimate the head-down time
required by the different display formats.
The results revealed that both display augmentations improved performance (safety) as assessed by predicted
and actual loss of separation (i.e., penetration of the protected zone). Both enhancements also reduced workload, as
assessed by the NASA TLX scale. The intruder predictor display produced these benefits with no substantial impact on
the qualitative nature of the avoidance maneuvers that were selected. The threat vector produced the safety benefits by
inducing a greater degree of (effective) lateral maneuvering, thus partially offsetting the benefits of reduced workload.
The three displays did not differ in terms of their effect on performance of the monitoring task, used to infer head-down
time, nor in the extent of vertical or airspeed maneuvering. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for
cognitive engineering design features.
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Introduction
In twoprevioustudieson this contract, we have examined three issues with regard to cockpit displays of
traffic information, using a general paradigm in which pilots flew a low fidelity simulator in a series of conflict problems
with one or two intruders. (Merwin and Wickens, 1996; Merwin, O'Brien, and Wickens, 1997; O'Brien and Wickens,
1997).
(1) In both studies, we comparatively evaluated 2D (coplanar: plan view and profile) with a 3D (perspective)
displays. The latter option had been considered promising, on the basis of the earlier findings of Ellis, McGreevy, and
Hitchcock (1987), and on the basis of the fact that tactical maneuvering for free flight might often require integrated
maneuvering in both the lateral and vertical dimension; an integration which we hypothesized might be facilitated by the
integrated perspective display. In fact however, both studies yielded a consistent pattern of results indicating an
advantage for the coplanar display, particularly in depicting traffic conflicts in which the intruder showed vertical
behavior. We attributed the differences between these findings, and those of Ellis et al., who had found a cost for the 2D
display, to the fact that their study, in contrast to ours, did not incorporate a separate analog profile display, to
accompany the plan view display in the 2D condition.
(2) In O_Brien and Wickens (1997), we considered the joint representation of weather and traffic, concluding
that these two important hazard data bases would be best represented if they were integrated on a single display panel
(whether 2D or 3D), rather than separated. Consistent with the Proximity Compatibility Principle (Wickens and
Carswell, 1995), this integration was observed to be most beneficial on traffic problems in which the solution required
joint consideration of traffic AND weather.
(3) Both studies examined the preferred maneuver stereotypes, and both revealed pilot preference to maneuver
in the vertical, rather than in the lateral dimension, although this overall preference was sometimes modulated by the
particular conflict geometry, and by the display type.
In spite of the three fairly robust conclusions drawn above, the two studies left a number of important issues
unresolved, issues which will be addressed by the third experiment in our project, reported here.
The first issue concerns the particular aspects of the symbology that we employed. Following a cognitive task
analysis of the pilot's information needs during conflict avoidance planning, we developed what appeared to be a
2
I
ill
a
I
m
m
m
I11
n
u
l
I
u
J
J
i
i
I
m
U
w2
w
w
=
7.
reasonable symbology set. By applying principles of ecological interface design (Vicente and Rasmussen, 1992), we
developed two features that would represent perceptually, information necessary for decisions that pilots would
otherwise have to derive cognitively. One set of features were predictive indicators for the intruder traffic. The second
feature was a threat vector, that indicated the direction and beating to the point of closest passage. Its length was
proportional to the size of ownship's protected zone, and the position at which it intersected ownship's predictor line,
indicated the time remaining fill the point of closest passage (or loss of separation) was reached. Characteristics of both
of these features will be more fully described in the Methods section.
Although pilots in the first two studies appeared to find these tools useful, there was no f'um validation that they
WERE in fact useful, since we did not manipulate their presence. Indeed two possible arguments could be raised as to
why these tools might not be desirable. On the one hand, they both add some "clutter" to the display, possibly hindering
pilot's ability to search for other information. On the other hand, while both might offer additional useful information for
conflict negotiation, pilots may process this added information by investing additional cognitive resources, and hence
increase workload. Indeed Yeh and Wickens (1988) have reported that the added information provided by predictive
displays, while improving tracking performance, can also increase workload (Herron, 1980). In the multitask
environment of the cockpit, any added workload associated with a traffic display would be likely to impose a clear cost
on the performance of other tasks.
The possible workload effects associated with the traffic display leads to the second issue addressed in the
current study: examining the traffic displays in the multitask context. In order to establish whether the added features of
the traffic displays actually did impose added workload, we chose two approaches to workload measurement. First,
subjective workload measures of the 3 different display options, varying in the presence of predictors and threat vector,
were compared using the NASA TLX measure (Hart & Staveland, 1988). Second, the possible resource costs associated
with the different displays were evaluated by imposing a secondary task, simulating the visual demands of out-of-cockpit
monitoring. Other investigators have evaluated the workload (and resulting head-down time) associated with cockpit
traffic displays (Battiste and Bortulussi, 1988; Hart and Wempe, 1979; Abbott et al., 1980). All revealed that there is,
naturally, some resource cost to these displays, although none have quantified the costs in terms of head-down time.
Sirevaag et al. (1993), have specifically examined head-down costs associated with cockpit technology, but they
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compareddigitalandauditorydisplayofnavigationalinformation,ratherthangraphicalportrayaloftrafficinformation.
Finally,Kreifeldt(1980)did examinetheworkloadcostsassociatedwithtrafficpredictorinformation;butuseda
workloadmeasureofcommunicationsfrequency,ratherthanonethatcouldbedirectlytranslatedintoameasureofspare
timeor effort.Usinghismeasure,Kreifeldtreportednodifferencesbetweenconditionswithandwithoutraffic
prediction.
Whileourstudyfallsfarshortof realcockpitrealism,thecurrenteffortdoesgobeyondthesingletask
evaluationsofCDTIsymbologycardedoutintheprevioustwostudiesofthiscontract(Merwin,O'Brien,andWickens,
1997),toconsidertheuseofthedisplayinthecontextoftwoimportantflighttasks;aircraftcontrol,andout-of-cockpit
scanning.
Thethirdissueweaddressconcernspilotpreferencefordifferentmaneuvertypes.Asnotedabove,thetwo
previousstudiesfoundapreferenceforverticalconflictavoidance;butbothstudiesconstrainedpilotstoflyatafixed
airspeed.In actualflightofcourse,threedegreesoffreedomareavailable;lateral,vertical,andlongitudinal(airspeed)
control.Indeedit iseasilypossibletoenvisioncircumstancesinwhichamomentaryslowingorspeeding,ratherthana
climb,descent,oraturn,canpreventapossiblepenetrationfaprotectedzone.However,theoveralleconomiccosts
andfeasibilityof thethreedifferentclassesofmaneuversisnotequivalent(KrozelandPeters,1997),noris thetime
window ithinwhicheachformofmaneuverisaviableoption.Forexample,verticalcontrolisthemostfeasibletobe
implementedatthelastminute.Toaddressthisissuemorefully,intheexperimentwereporthereweprovidedpilots
withthrottlecontrol,whichtheycoulduseinadditionto(orinsteadof)lateralandverticalcontroltoavoidconflicts,
Thusin thepresentstudy,ourpilotsflewaseriesofconflictrafficencounterswithasingleintruder,whose
geometry(approaching,crossing,overtaking,ascending,level,descending)wasvariedunpredictably.Pilotswereto
judgeif theintruderwaslikelytopenetratetheprotectedzone(mostintruderswere),andif so,tomaneuvertheaircraft
insuchawayastoavoidpenetration,andalsominimizedeviationfromtheoverallinitialflightparametersofthetrial.
Whilepilotsflew,aseriesofveryfaintargetsappearedinrandompositionsacrossthetopmarginofthedisplay,targets
thatrequiredfovealvisionfor detection.Becauseof theirunpredictablenatureandthefactthattheycouldnotbe
detectedwithperipheral(upperfield)vision,thesetargetprobesimposedthesamedemandsa outofcockpitscanning.
Delaysintheirdetectioncouldbedirectlyattributabletovisualworkloadassociatedwithprocessingthedisplay.
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Participants
All participants were licensed flight instructors from the University of Illinois Institute of
Aviation and received $5 per hour for their participation. Fifteen male pilots participated in the
study. The mean number of flight hours for all participants was 341 hours. All pilots were
instrument rated, and had a mean number of 80.3 instrument flight hours.
Simulation Flight Dynamics and Apparatus
The simulation was run on a Silicon Graphics 4D/30 Super Turbo workstation and
viewed on a Silicon Graphics 20-inch color display. The display screen resolution was 1280 x
1024 pixels and was run at a frequency of 60 hertz. The simulation allowed subjects to control
ownship's airspeed, altitude, and heading. These variables were controlled through a flight stick
located on the fight-hand side of the Silicon Graphics workstation. The flight stick allowed
maximum pitch and bank angles of +/-5 degrees and +/-30 degrees respectively, in order to preclude
any extreme maneuvers aimed towards evading impending traffic conflicts. Speed control was
maintained through the flight stick as well, with increased speed (at a constant rate) resulting from
pushing the button on top of the flight stick and decreased flight speed corresponding with pressing
the trigger. The maximum speed change capability was +/-150 knots, which translated into a
maximum flight speed of 475 knots and a minimum of 175. Although pilots were provided with
the capability of using speed control as a means of managing traffic conflicts, they were instructed
to deviate from the prescribed speed of 325 knots as little as possible. The same was instructed for
ownship's prescribed altitude (10,000 feet) and heading values (towards the waypoint). Light
turbulence was programmed into the simulation, causing ownship to at times drift slowly from the
prescribed heading and pitch angles should active control not be maintained. A linear cross-
couplingfunctionwasalsoincludedin theflight simulationdynamics,causingcross-coupled
responsesto inputto theflightcontrols(e.g.pitchingup resultedin adecreasein theaircraft's
speed,andbankingresultedinapitchingdownoftheaircraftnose) as is found in real flight.
Task and Simulation
Pilots flew a series of six "missions" throughout two separate experimental sessions (3
missions per session). Each mission was comprised of ten consecutive (1-2 minute) flight
scenarios. In each scenario, pilots were required to fly to a designated navigational waypoint (a
VOR located directly ahead of ownship) without coming into conflict with the "intruder" aircraft
located in their airspace, while maintaining the prescribed flight parameters to the greatest extent
possible (heading, speed and altitude). In all scenarios, airspace traffic was comprised of one
additional aircraft (referred to as the "intruder") within ownship's airspace. In every mission, nine
of the ten flight scenarios were designed as "conflict" scenarios requiring the pilot to execute
avoidance maneuvers in order to resolve an impending conflict. The task required pilots to
determine if the intruder's flightpath would penetrate the protected zone around ownship, and if so,
use any means of maneuvering (including speed, heading, or altitude control) in order to avoid
coming into conflict with the intruder. Pilots were instructed to do this in a way so as to
minimize deviations in speed, heading, and altitude from their prescribed values. Ownship's
designated conflict zone was +/-1,500 feet vertically and 3 miles horizontally, meaning that if the
intruder aircraft came within these minimum separation boundaries, both aircraft would engage in a
conflict. Pilots were instructed to avoid such engagements.
Displays
A schematic of the general display format used by all participants is presented in Figure
1. The display format chosen for the experiment was a 2-D coplanar display, with a top-down and
corresponding forward-looking view of the airspace surrounding ownship. The display included an
ADI (attitude directional indicator) located in the top center region of the screen which was used by
subjects to maintain aircraft attitude (pitch and bank levels). The vertical strips located on adjacent
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sides of the horizontal situation indicator (I-ISI) represent the altimeter (right) and airspeed indicator
(left) respectively. Visual Scanning demands of the FFOV (forward field of view) or "out-the-
cockpit view" were represented abstractly by ellipses that appeared at random locations and times
throughout each trial within the horizontal bar extending across the top of the screen.
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Figure 1.
The Present Experiment's Airborne Free Flight Display
Values in the boxes on the airspeed and altitude scales represent command values.
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The horizontal situation indicator (HSI), used to represent traffic, portrayed a top-down (x-
z axes) and forward-looking (x-y axes) view of the pilot's surrounding airspace. The traffic
symbology was overlaid on a grid of equi-spaced lines representing 5 nautical mile increments.
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The lines were comprised of dots positioned at intervals of 1 nautical mile. The grid rotates with
ownship to provide consistent spacing information of traffic symbology. The top-down view of
the traffic display contained air traffic symbology consisting of ownship and intruder's aircraft
icons, a hexagonal VOR (navigational waypoint) symbol representing the location of the subject's
destination and dependent upon the display condition the subject was viewing, predictor lines on
both aircraft, and a threat vector stemming from ownship's predictor line. The three display
conditions are illustrated in figure 2.
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Figure 2
The Three display Conditions
Threat Vector (TV) Condition 3
(othership w/predictor & threat vector)
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All display conditions presented ownship with a predictor line-- a vector projected from
the nose of the aircraft extending 45 seconds into the future which provided pilots with a graphical
depiction of their aircraft's future position based on currently maintained parameters (heading and
airspeed). In the baseline (BL) display condition, only ownship had a predictor line, and no threat
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vector was displayed. The second condition CIP=intruder predictor) included predictor lines on both
ownship and the intruder aircraft. The third condition (IV=threat vector) included predictor lines on
both aircraft, in addition to a threat vector emanating from somewhere along ownship's predictor
line. The threat vector indicated the point of closest possible conflict with the intruder's aircraft.
As illustrated by Merwin & Wickens (I996), the threat vector extends from somewhere
along'ownship's predictor line and points in the direction at which the intruder would pass closest
to ownship ff both aircraft maintained their current heading and vertical velocity. The endpoint of
the threat vector moved closer to the intruder's predictor line as the predicted minimum separation
decreases. Additionally, the threat vector moves closer to ownship;s aircraft symbol as the time to
actual conflict decreases. Pilots were instructed to avoid contact between the threat vector's
endpoint and the other aircraft's predictor line or aircraft symbol at all times, for such contact
would signal a predicted or actual loss of separation (conflict). The threat vector allowed pilots to
directly perceive, rather than having to estimate, the proximity of the intruder to ownship's
protected zone. As the time to conflict between ownship and intruder decreased, the threat vector
moved along the predictor line toward ownship's aircraft symbol, explicitly representing the time
to actual conflict. In the current simulation, the dimensions of the protected zone were +/-1,500
feet vertically and 3 miles horizontally. In the display condition which included the threat vector
(TV), if the threat vector touched the intruder's predictor line, a predicted conflict cccun_ and both
aircraft would highlight indicating to the pilot that he was engaged in a predicted conflict.
The distinction between the display symbology for a predicted conflict and for an actua/
conflict is depicted in figure 3. As demonstrated in Figure %3'a,when ownship's threat vector is not
touching the intruder's predictor line or aircraft symbol, no conflict is predicted. As illustrated in
Figure 3 b, a conflict is predicted when ownship's threat vector is touching the intruder's predictor
or aircraft symbol. In this case, ownship is in a predicted conflict with the intruder, and as
indicated by the position of the threat vector along ownship's line, an actual conflict will occur in
20 seconds if no evasive action is taken by ownship. Figure 3 c depicts ownship in an actua/
conflict.
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(b) Predicted conflict
Figure 3
Predicted and Actual Conflict Illustrations
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(c) actual conflict
The forward-looking view of the coplanar display contained a set Of parallel yellow
horizontal lines representing ownship's current vertical protected zone boundaries (1,500 feet above
and below ownship). The dashed yellow horizontal lines represented the predicted vertical protected
zone boundaries 45 seconds into the future.
Color-coding was implemented for the symbology in the traffic display as a means of
facilitating pilot perception of aircraft status states. The pilot's aircraft symbol and predictor line
were colored magenta while the intruder and its predictor line were colored gray. The threat vector
was always orange in color. When ownship was in predicted conflict with the intruder, the two
aircraft and associated predictor lines would highlight.
The traffic display incorporated a "FFOV indicator symbol" superimposed on the
horizontal strip extending across the top of the screen, which simulated the visual scanning
demands of the forward field of view (FFOV) or "out-the-window" view. The indicators appeared
in randomly designated locations across the horizontal bar, at randomly generated times throughout
each trial. Each indicator remained visible for a 15s period, or until noticed and acknowledged by
the subject by pressing the space bar on the flight simulator keyboard. Three or four FFOV
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indicator symbols were presented in each approximately 1.5 minute trial. The pilot's task was to
maintain his flight duties (heading, airspeed, and altitude) while detecting and avoiding traffic
conflicts, and maintaining attention in the FFOV region in the display. The appearances of the
FFOV indicators were configured so as to not be detectable through the pilot's peripheral vision,
but rather had to be directly observed in order to be detected. In addition to the collection of
response time (RT) measures (time to notice and respond to the occurrence of the FFOV indicator
by pressing the space bar), accuracy was calculated as a proportion of hits (times when the change
is responded to) to the total number of FFO_¢ indicators that occured).
Experimental Design
A 3 x 3 x 3 factorial, within-subjects design was used. The factors of interest included
display type (BL, IP, or TV), vertical traffic geometry (ascending, level, descending) md
longitudinal geometry (45, 90, and 135 degrees). The three display types sought to evaluate the
effectiveness of flightpath predictor and threat vector display aids on pilot performance. The three
display types included: ('BL) ownship had a predictor line while intruder did not, (IP) both ownship
and intruder had predictor lines, and (TV) both ownship and the intruder had a predictor line, ard
additionally, a threat vector was present. The order in which subjects saw the three display types
was randomized and counterbalanced across sessions 1 and 2. Pictorial examples of each display
type are illustrated in figure 2.
The intruder approach geometries with respect to ownship were varied in order to ensure
exposure to a variety of traffic patterns, including three vertical geometries (ascending, level, and
descending), and three longitudinal geometries (45, 90 and 135 degrees) and approached from either
the left or fight side of ownship. The intruder approach geometries were randomized over both
sessions 1 and 2 so that each subject saw every possible combination of intruder vertical and lateral
geometry (including left and fight approaches). While an approximately equal number of intruder
approaches were from the left and fight, this was not classified as an independent variable.
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Together, these geometries combined to produce eighteen ways in which ownship was approached
by the intruder aircraft, as can be seen in the illustration below in Figure ,.
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Figure 4
Diagram of Intruder Approach Geometries.
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Procedure
Subjectswereaskedto participatein two sessionson two separatedays,eachlasting
approximately 1.5 hours. In the _ session, participants were read instructions and shown
illustrations relating to the task and display symbologies used in the experiment in order to
famil/arizethem withthesimulation.Upon completionof theinstructions,the experimenter
clarifiedany aspectsofthetaskthatremainedunclearto thesubject.Subjectsthenflewtwelve
practice scenarios in which they familiazized themselves with the displays (including the
display conditions), the display symbology, and the flight task. Upon successful completion of
these practice trials, subjects began session t and completed the first three missions.
In the second session, subjects flew an additional set of six practice trials and then
completed the last three missions. Upon completion of each mission in this final session,
participants were administered the NASA TLX subjective workload scale for each display type ('BL,
IP, TV). They then completed a post-experiment questionnaire which queried pilots as to their
preferred traffic avoidance maneuvers and strategies, as well as their preference in display type.
Finally, participants were asked for any other additional comments and thanked for their
participation. The full instructions for the participants are presented in the Appendix.
m
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Results
Primary Task: Traffic Avoidance
Figure 5 presents the effects of display on the mean number of conflicts with the protected zone of the traffic. A
repeated measures ANOVA revealed that this critical parameter of safety yielded a marginally significant effect of
display type (F2,28=3.01; p=.09), revealing a monotonic improvement in safety as more display information was
provided (i.e., from baseline to intruder predictor to threat vector). Figure 6 portrays a stronger effect of display type on
the number of predicted conflicts (see Figure 3b; F2,28=19.28; p<.01). These are less serious conditions, but ones
that, if they occur, would probably alert ATC in a free flight scenario. In this case, each added display feature produced
a reliable reduction in the number of predicted conflicts. There were no interactions between display type and the
conflict geometry for either of the two safety parameters.
The actual flight trajectories were analyzed by assessing the RMS deviations of the maneuver away from the
commanded trajectories (i.e., initial target parameters) on each of the three controlled axes. Analysis of these data
revealed a marginally significant effect of display type on lateral deviations (F2,28=3.10; p=.10), with a pattern
suggesting that the TV display induced more lateral maneuvering than did either the BL or IP displays. This pattern was
reinforced by the finding that the TV display also yielded longer trajectories than the other displays (and significantly
longer ones than the IP display; F1,14=4.46; p=.05), and induced a greater amount of lateral control displacement than
the IP display (F1,14=3.20; p=. 10). There was no evidence from the flight path deviation measures that the display type
altered the amount of vertical maneuvers selected, although the TV display did induce a marginally greater amount of
vertical control (i.e., elevator) activity when compared with the IP display (F1,14=3.98; p<.07). We attribute this to the
greater amount of altitude compensation, to result from the greater amount of lateral maneuvering, given the tendency of
the simulated aircraft to pitch down in a turn. The data suggested that display type did not influence the amount of
airspeed maneuvering.
Primary Task: Workload Analysis
Analysis of the overall TLX workload score (average across the 6 subscales) as a function of display type,
revealed a pattern very similar to that shown by the safety measures (F2,28=3.08; p=.08). That is, a monotonic and
marginally significant trend toward lower workload was found, as progressively more display information is provided.
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Figure 7 breaks the workload effects down into the separate subscales, and reveals two interesting characteristics. First,
the major reduction in workload across all scales is evident between the baseline (BL) and intruder predictor (IP)
displays, with few differences observed between the IP and TV displays. Second, the exception to the first characteristic
is in the mental demand scale (#1), which separates the three conditions by approximately equal amounts. Indeed a
separate ANOVA conducted only on this subscale revealed a highly significant main effect of display (172,28=9.39;
p,.01). It is noteworthy that in the mental demand scale, the larger differences (greater variance accounted for) was
observed between the BL and IP display (1:1,14 = 7.0), than between the IP and the TV display (F1,14=3.6). This
difference will have some importance in interpreting the results that were obtained.
Secondary Task: Event Detection
Mean response time for the monitoring event detection task was approximately 4.1 seconds, indicating that
pilots spent a good deal of their time head down, and hence produced a substantial lag in detecting the events. This time
did not differ between the three display conditions. Mean accuracy was also equivalent between conditions, with an
average hit rate of about 0.70. Finally, while false alarm rate showed a monotonic trend to increase with more display
information (i.e., from BL to IP to TV), this effect did not approach statistical reliability (P>0.10).
NASA Workload Rating by Question
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There were two relatively weak effects of conflict geometry on safety measures. Descending traffic produced
fewer predicted conflicts than either level or ascending traffic (F2,891 -- 2.76; p < .06), and overtaking (45 °) conflicts
produces fewer actual conflicts than orthogonal or converging conflicts (F8,891 = 2.38; p =. I0).
Discussion
The primary objective of the present study was to examine the workload implications of different levels of
information for traffic depiction. The results reveal that the original design intentions used by Merwin and Wickens
(1996) to create the display symbology according to cognitive engineering principles was successful. Such principles are
based upon providing information in a format that directly serves the cognitive characteristics of the pilots' task, and
does so in a way that replaces cognitive operations with perceptual ones (Vicente and Rasmussen, 1992). In this
context, the impact of two display components can be examined, the addition of intruder predictor information, and the
addition of the threat vector.
7
Table 1 summarizes the primary results of the study, in terms of the implications of adding each "layer" of
information.
Condition
Manipulation
Safety
Control Activity
Subjective Workload
Task Interference
(head-down time)
BL IP TV
p
Adding Intruder Adding Threat
Predictor Vector
Improves Improves
Unchanged More Lateral
Decreased in All Respects Decreased Mental Demands
Unchanged Effort,
Physical Demands
Unchanged Unchanged
Table 1
As Table 1 reveals, both of these additions supported safer performance, marginally so, in the case of actual
17
conflicts, and strongly in the case of predicted conflicts. Further analysis however revealed that the nature of the support
provided by each element was slightly different. Providing the threat vector allowed, or encouraged pilots to fly slightly
different maneuvers, using a greater amount of lateral deviations and lateral control. In contrast, providing the intruder
predictor information had no influence on control or maneuver strategy behavior, but, presumably allowed pilots to do
the same job better than in the baseline condition. This difference in the effects of the two display augmentations was
reflected in differences in assessed workload. Figure 7 reveals the pronounced drop in all workload aspects created by
providing the intruder predictor. However, the figure also reveals that, except for the mental demand scale, any further
workload reduction that might have been provided by the threat vector, was offset by either the added control activity
that was induced, or by the added cognitive effort required to process the (very useful) information offered by the threat
vector.
However, summarizing the overall workload results, and focusing particularly on the mental demand scale, it is
apparent that our efforts to make perceptually visible, quantities that would otherwise need to be cognitively derived,
reduced the workload demands and simultaneously improved performance, a key goal of cognitive engineering
(Rasmussen et al., 1995) and its closely associated field of ecological interface design (Vicente and Rasmussen, 1992).
Considering the implications of the current results for performance in the broader context of the flight task, the
data did not suggest that the reduced workload (resource demand) of the higher information levels actually provided any
spare visual capacity for monitoring the far domain, since RT to the secondary task of event monitoring was delayed
equally across all three display conditions. At the same time, it is important to observe that greater interference was NOT
observed with the higher information level displays. Such interference might have been predicted had the greater (but
more useful) information of the PI and "IV required a greater time cost and effort expenditure to process (Yeh and
Wickens, 1988; Herron, 1980). That such a cost was not imposed here may be attributable to the careful design of the
display features based upon pilot input (Merwin and Wickens, 1996).
With regard to the impact of displays on control performance, we found less general evidence for display X
maneuver interactions than were observed in the previous studies in this project (Merwin, O'Brien, and Wickens, 1997).
In particular, although pilots here were given the opportunity to use airspeed control in the current study, we did not
observe that its use was modulated by the nature of the displayed information.
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In conclusion, the current results appear to validate the adequacy of the 2D coplanar display for traffic
information, which could be used in a free flight scenario or, alternatively, used to support pilot traffic awareness in a
more conventional ATC-based airspace, although they also point to the substantial head-down cost of using such
displays for traffic avoidance maneuvers. Our results do not speak to the many additional issues associated with the
choice between ground and air-based control. Adequate traffic displays are a necessary, but only small piece of the free
flight puzzle. Furthermore, the current results strongly urge the conduct of additional higher fidelity flight simulations.
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Appendix X.
Free Flight Experiment:
Instructions for Participants
g
i
Introduction
The FA.A and NASA have recently undertaken research efforts towards examining specific ways
to improve the efficiency of the National Airspace System. These efforts have resulted in the
development of a program known as Free Flight.
Arising from the need to employ innovative solutions to safely and efficiently maintain air
traffic- separation in increasingly denser skyways, the concept of free flight involves shifting
air traffic management responsibilities from air traffic control (ATC) to in-flight
pilots. Under free flight conditions, pilots will have the capability, and the responsibility, of
selecting and implementing their own flight parameters to their destinations including route, speed, and
altitude. The responsibility of maintaining air traffic separation will be redirected from Air Traffic
Control (ATC) to pilots, with ATC imposing restrictions only to resolve conflicts, preclude exceeding
airport capacity, prevent unauthorized flight through Special Use Airspace, and ensure ultimate flight
safety (RTCA, 1995). The goal is to provide each pilot with the flexibility to optimize their flightpath
while maintaining the safety and efficiency of the overall system (Planzer & lenny, 1995), as doing so
can afford a varietyof ATM benefits.
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Significant human factors challenges arise with the implementation of free flight. Such
challenges include the design and implementation of displays to support traffic and hazard awareness in
the cockpit, and the assessment of pilot performance in relation to such displays.
The purpose of this experiment is to examine flight performance, workload, attentional
demands and the effectiveness of certain display aids (predictors and threat vectors) in response to an
airborne traffic display and associated air traffic management responsibilities that come with it. Your
participation will help us complete our research which will contribute to NASA and the FAA's
understanding of pilot and system performance in relation to airborne traffic management displays.
Task Overview (experimenter read to pilot)
In this study, you will be asked to fly a desktop flight simulator which includes a traffic display
such as would be used in a cockpit equipped with free flight capabilities. Accordingly, your task wiIl be
to not only fly to your waypoint (VOR) destination, but also to effectively avoid the traffic in your
airspace using the free flight display. You will be asked to complete 2 separate sessions (approximately
1.25 hours each). In each session, you will fly 3 "missions". Each mission is comprised of a series of
10 short (1-2 minute) trials. You will complete a total of six (6) missions.
Your task is to fly (adhering as closely as possible to a prescribed altitude of 10,000 feet, speed
of 325 knots, and a heading aimed at the VOR) towards a designated waypoint (VOR) while monitoring
the traffic display for potential conflicts and engaging in avoidance maneuvers if necessary. Traffic
conflicts are defined as penetrations of the protected zone around your aircraft (+/- 1500 feet vertically, 3
mile horizontal radius). The primary goal of your task is to reach the designated
waypoint while maintaining the prescribed flight parameters and avoiding any
predicted or actual traffic conflicts. You must also monitor the horizontal gray strip extending
across the top of the display for the occurrence of FFOV indicators (see Figure 1) (experimenter: please
show the subject the color picture of the display, along with Figure 1 and point out all information
discussed in this preceding paragraph).
As an overview, you will have 3 tasks to perform:
1. Fly the aircraft as smoothly and efficiently as possible to the waypoint (i.e., minimizing
changes in flight parameters (325 knots, 10,000 ft, VOR heading).
2. Monitor your traffic display and use it to guide your maneuvers around any conflicting traffic
if necessary.
3. Monitor the simulated view out the windshield for visual sightings of traffic.
Your task will now be described in greater detail:
I. Fly the prescribed heading and altitude toward the navigational waypoint (VOR). Maintain the
prescribed flight parameters (altitude = 10,000 ft, speed = 325 knots, heading
= towards waypoint (VOR)) to the extent possible (when not maneuvering to
avoid intruder aircraft)[
2. Remember to monitor the gray horizontal strip extending across the top of the display for FFOV
(forward field of view) indicator ellipses to appear. Faint flashes of light appearing as an ellipse
will appear at random times and locations across the panel throughout each trial. These simulate the
demands of out of the cockpit traffic monitoring, and you should indicate their appearance a s
soon as you notice them by pressing the space bar on the keyboard. The
percentage that you identify, in addition to the time it took you to identify them in will be recorded
L
and incorporated into performance scores. It is vital that you monitor this bar for the
occurrence of indicator dots an press the space bar each time you identify one.
To help facilitate this, please rest your left hand on the pad in front of the keyboard.
3, Monitor the traffic display for anticipated conflicts. There will always be only one other aircraft in
your airspace, which may or may not pose a traffic threat. The "intruder" aircraft will always
maintain its heading, speed, and pre-determined altitude. In other words, the other aircraft will not
act in response to your own aircraft's behavior, or change it's speed, heading or altitude. It will
continue to do what it is doing at the beginning of the trial,
4. If you assess the current and predicted situation and feel that a conflict will occur, maneuver so as to
avoid the conflict but remember to return as soon as possible to a heading and altitude that will
intersect the navigational waypoint on the display (towards the VOR, at 10,000 feet), and to the
325 knot airspeed prescribed. Maneuvers should be as "efficient" as possible without
compromising separation between your aircraft and the other aircraft. That is, you should try to
deviate as little as possible from your prescribed heading, altitude and airspeed, while safely
maneuvering around the conflict. You may use ANY means you wish in maneuvering
(changing your altitude, speed or heading) so as to maintain separation. No one way
of maneuvering is preferred. Your choice for maintaining separation should be based on what
you would actually do in the cockpit were you involved in the same situation. No one means is more
desirable than any other, and there are no restrictions on the method you choose for maintaining
adequate separation between aircraft.
5. The trial will end when you reach within 3 miles of the waypoint and are at an altitude between
9,000 and 11,000 feet (resulting in successful trial completion) or when you pass the waypoint
outside of the specified parameters (resulting in unsuccessful trial completion).
6. Remember that your primary objective is to reach the navigational waypoint
without coming into conflict with the other traffic. The threat vector line (see figure
2c) indicates where the nearest threat is predicted to be when you reach the threat vector, so you can
use the vector to determine how close other aircraft will come to your protected zone. The threat
vector will move toward your aircraft symbol as the time until the threat is closest decreases. Also,
the end of the threat vector indicates the edge of your protected zone. Therefore, if the threat vector
reaches another aircraft's predictor line, a conflict is predicted to occur (at the time that the threat
vector reaches your aircraft symbol), unless you deviate from your current course. You will know
that this has occurred because your aircraft and the intruder aircraft will highlight (as will their
corresponding predictor lines). Said again, if the threat vector touches the intruder's predictor line,
you are in a predicted conflict. If the threat vector touches the intruder's aircraft symbol, you are in
an actual conflict. You should avoid triggering predicted conflicts (this is when ATC
would intervene to resolve the situation), as well as actual conflicts! Experimenter: show
and discuss Figure 3 illustrations to your pilot: (a) no conflict, (b) predicted conflict, and (c) actual
conflict situations.
Any questions so far?
Displays, Symboiogy and Conflicts
In addition to the schematic drawing in Figure I, you have been provided with a picture of the
actual display that you will be flying in order to familiarize yourself with the display's various
components, including the display symbology and coding, and an example of a type of traffic conflict
you may encounter.
Display Components (Experimenter illustrate each of the below components on the color
picture of display)
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• ADI
= HSI (coplanar: top down and forward-looking)
• airspeed indicator
• altimeter
• FFOV or "out-the-window" horizontal bar
The 3 Display Conditions
Throughout the simulation, you will be using three different types of displays (experimenter:
show and illustrate the following with Figure 2). The three display types differ only with respect to the
following parameters: in one display condition, only ownship had a predictor vector. In the second
condition included predictor vectors on both ownship and intruder. In the third condition, predictors
appeared on both ownship and the intruder aircraft, in addition to the display of a threat vector.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Display Symbology (experimenter: use color display picture to accompany explanation of
the following symbologies):
5.
Grid: the dots comprising the grid are separated by one mile increments. One grid block is five
miles by five miles. The grid is always 5000 feet below ownship's current position. In the display
conditions when there is no threat vector indicating ownship's protected zone, you can use the grid
to help you in estimating where your protected zone is. For example, the threat vector length is the
radius of ownship's protected airspace. It extends the approximately 4 miles into the future, which
equals the distance represented by 4 dots on the grid.
Waypoint: the waypoint will always be at an altitude of 10,000 feet, directly in front of ownship
at the beginning of each scenario. Its horizontal position is depicted on the grid.
Ownship: your aircraft (referred to as ownship) is magenta and begins at an altitude of 10,000 feet.
Traffic (intruder aircraft): the intruder aircraft is colored gray under non-conflict conditions.
When in a predicted or actual conflict occurs with the intruder, both planes highlight and intruder
turns bright yellow.
Predictor lines: extend from the nose of the aircraft and represent the predicted flight path 45
seconds (4 miles) into the future.
6. Threat vector: threat vectors are orange and point in the direction at which you would see the
other aircraft pass closest to ownship. The threat vector moves closer to ownship's actual aircraft
symbol as time to conflict decreases. The end point of the threat vector moves closer to the intruder
aircraft's predictor line as your predicted separation decreases. Therefore avoid contact between the
threat vector's endpoint and the intruder's predictor line at all times. Even though this condition
does not indicate an actual conflict (loss of separation), it is a condition in which a conflict is
predicted to occur if no one maneuvers. Hence ATC would be alerted and would be likely to assume
positive control for traffic separation. This is a circumstance you would like to avoid, as it defeats
the rules of free flight.
7. The distinction between the display symbology for a predicted conflict, and for an actual conflict
are depicted in Figure 3. As demonstrated in Figure 3a, when ownship's threat vector is not
t _
t.J
Ttouching intruder's predictor line or aircraft symbol, no conflict is predicted. As illustrated in
Figure 3b, a conflict is predicted when ownship's threat vector is touching the intruder's predictor
or aircraft symbol. In this case, ownship is in a predicted conflict with the intruder. Figure 3c
depicts ownship in an actual conflict. Remember that your task is to avoid engaging in
predicted and actual eonflicts/
8. In the display conditions where the threat vector and intruder's predictor line are absent (see fig 2a),
you must use your best judgment to avoid predicted and actual conflicts.
9. Solid yellow lines on the forward-looking (bottom panel) view of the HSI: the solid yellow lines
represent current vertical protected zone boundaries (1500 feet above and below ownship) while
dashed yellow lines represent predicted protected zone boundaries. (illustrate with figure 4).
Ephi expand on this.
10. Forward field of view (FFOV) indicator: this horizontal bar across the top of the display represents
the visual attentional demands of the "out-the-window" view. An ellipse (visible in figure 1)
appears randomly several times throughout each scenario. Assume that you are flying VFR, in
which ease, your task is to direct your attention to this FFOV representation as often as possible so
as to notice the appearance of all ellipses. How quickly you notice the appearance o f
each ellipse, in addition to the percentage that you notice, will be used in
performance scores. It is very important to notice them and press the spacebar
as quickly as possible after the occurrence of one! When you see each FFOV indicator,
press the space bar on the keyboard in front of you. Please position your hand on the pad in front of
the keyboard at all times so that the space bar is close at hand.
If you have any questions, please discuss them with your experimenter.
Day 1:
Day 2:
Schedule:
Session 1:
Statement of Consent
9 practice scenarios (3 per display type)
short break (you may stand up, rest, go to the restroom etc. during this time)
Mission 1 (10 scenarios)
short break
Mission 2 (10 scenarios)
short break
Mission 3 (10 scenarios)
Session 2:
6 practice scenarios (2 per display type)
short break
Mission 4 (10 scenarios)
*NASA TLX Workload scale
short break
Mission 5 (10 scenarios)
*NASA TLX Workload scale
short break
Mission 6 (10 scenarios)
*NASA TLX Workload scale
• Post-experiment questionnaire
• Payment form/payment
• Thank you!
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